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# NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

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## ART. I. — POINTS IN AMERICAN POLITICS.

THE late political storm struck the ship of state at its weakest point, and as these storms return periodically there seems to be a kind of common consent that some substantial repairing or rebuilding must be done. The experience of mankind and the testimony of writers on civil polity agree that an elective monarchy is, of all governments, the most liable to disquiet, violence, and the peril of disruption. In this category they include elective chief-magistrates of sovereign states, by whatever name they are called, and however limited may be their powers. Our ancestors determined upon a form of government which gave us a single elective head, clothed with as great powers as any monarch not absolute, and they trusted to escape the dangers attending his election, not only by the contrivance of distinct electoral colleges of States, but by the aid of many conservative and counteracting provisions, circumstances, and habits, upon which it was not unreasonable in them to rely. But now, not only is the contrivance of the electoral colleges evaded, but many of those things upon which they relied have disappeared from the body politic, and new practices and new elements of danger have shown themselves which they could not be expected to foresee. No one proposes to abandon or materially change the feature of the single elective head of the administration; but, whether by amendments proposed by Congress or by

the agency of a convention, it seems plain that some changes must be made touching the method of his election. At the same time some provisions must be arranged to secure the proper counting and ascertaining of the vote, which, though in the nature of details, are yet important; but there is one subject which seems to go far deeper, and to touch the wellsprings of our political life, about which little has been said, and this we propose to treat of first.

*Election by General Ticket.*

Under the power allowed by the Constitution to each State to appoint the electors of President in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct, it is familiar history that many of the States at first chose electors by their legislatures, and South Carolina continued that mode of choice until the Rebellion. Gradually the people asserted their preference for the choice of electors directly by themselves. As each State was entitled to as many electors as it had Senators and Representatives in Congress,—that is, two for the State, as such, and one for each member of the House,—they naturally chose one elector for each congressional district, and the two electors at large, either by the legislature or by the vote of the whole people of the State, and at length by the latter method only. This mode of choosing electors, namely, two by the vote of the whole State and one by the vote of each congressional district, was the safest and fairest method ever adopted. But causes came soon into operation which destroyed it. Having the right to determine its method of appointment without interference by Congress, the State legislatures began to require the choice of the whole college of electors on a single ticket voted for by the people of the whole State, instead of by single districts. Before that change, large States were often very nearly equally divided in their vote. In the contest between Mr. Adams and General Jackson, for instance, the district electors of New York were equally divided, while the two electors at large were carried for General Jackson.

This change did not come from any desire of the people themselves, but was rather the contrivance of the political managers and electioneering experts, who saw in it a great increase of their own power and importance. While the electors were chosen by single districts, the vote of an electoral district of New York or

Pennsylvania was not more important than the vote of a district of Rhode Island or New Jersey; and a majority, however large, in any section of a great State was of no more consequence than a like majority in a section of a small State. The vote of a citizen of a large State had no greater direct influence on the result than that of a citizen of a State of average or inferior political numbers. The minority, too, in each State had a chance of representation in the electoral college, the probabilities being that if they were considerable in numbers they would lead in some of the districts. Thus the electoral vote was fairly and equally dispersed over the whole country, and approximated closely to the popular vote in its results.

Great evils and dangers from the general-ticket system began to develop themselves, and have continued to do so, to the present time, with increasing force and malignity. Under the temptation of the great importance of carrying the Presidential election, increased to its utmost by the spoils system, frauds of the most extraordinary character, most complex and most various in their operations, have come into use. Manifold voting by ballot, personation of voters dead or removed, colonization, unlawful naturalizations, the stuffing of ballot-boxes, and, last and simplest of all, false returns by returning officers, have multiplied upon us in such manner as to excite almost as much of ridicule and amusement as of apprehension and disgust. Frauds in voting will be found wherever voters are human beings, but the extent of the frauds will depend upon the temptations offered. If the area of the operation of a great fraud is only a single electoral district, and it can determine only one electoral vote out of some four hundred, there will not be a temptation to invest in it much capital, labor, or risk. But if the area of its operation is an entire State, and it may determine the choice, not of one elector, but of thirty or forty, — one tenth of the entire vote of the Union, — the temptation is increased indefinitely. In our great cities, numbering their millions or half-millions of inhabitants, with universal suffrage and a large, ignorant, transient population, “alike unknowing and unknown,” such frauds on a large scale are not difficult. And they have been practised, as every honest citizen must admit. If in a Presidential election great States, like New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, are supposed to run very close, perhaps the majority

to be but a few thousands or even hundreds, the temptation to create the necessary thousands in the worst districts of their great cities, like New York, Philadelphia, and Cincinnati, has been found too strong for such virtue as abides with electioneering managers.

The difference between the results of voting by single districts and by general ticket may be brought home to the apprehensions of all by an illustration. Suppose all the people of the United States voted directly for President; suppose the law to require that the entire vote of each State should be cast by the majority of that State; suppose a large State to cast 505,000 for one candidate, and 495,000 for the other; the candidate having a majority would be credited with the whole 1,000,000 votes in summing up the aggregate vote of the Union. This is practically the result of this method now. Ever so small a majority throws the entire electoral vote of a State.

The unfairness of the present system, the great temptation it offers for frauds, and the great scope it gives to the operation of local frauds or even mistakes, ought to be sufficient to condemn it. But this statement does not exhaust, it does little more than begin to enumerate, the objections.

The present system of swinging the vast vote of a great State with such prodigious power as a unit in the election gives to a great State an undue preponderance over smaller States, such preponderance as almost to crush them. No matter how large may be the majority in a State of the middle rank, though it be almost a unanimity, it can carry but its 8, 10, or 12 votes, while the barest plurality in a great State swings the force of 20, 30, or 40 electoral votes. It was for this reason that we were constantly told that the late Presidential election was to be fought in a circle whose radius was ten miles from the City Hall in New York. This was substantially true. If the majority, however small, obtained for one candidate in that circle was larger than the majority given by the rest of the State of New York for another candidate, it would carry all the thirty-five electoral votes of New York, and so outweigh the largest possible majorities in States whose populations entitle them to a tenth or a twelfth part of the political power of the Union. The effect is also demoralizing upon the smaller States. It is of little import how great may be their majorities, or how

deep their feeling and interest. There is little left to them but to await in suspense the drawing of the lottery in the great State which is to control the result, however small its majority and however large an element in its composition may be fraud or mistake. It is still more demoralizing upon the great States. The knowledge that they wield this vast vote, which may be cast by ever so small a majority, offers the temptation to fraud of which we have spoken; necessarily brings to the front and gives great power and importance to the most dangerous and unscrupulous class of electioneering managers, and tends greatly to put in their power those who should be the best public men of the State. It adds greatly to the power of the spoils system. So great is the pressure for carrying majorities in the great capitals of great States that the party in power in the nation, State, or city is tempted to increase its force of servants and officers, to strain the party rein upon them to the utmost, and in fact to employ them during the whole period of the contest, in electioneering services, which they must render at the peril of losing their places. The substitution of single district voting, diminishing so much the importance of local majorities, will do something toward lessening the hold of the spoils system upon the public, as the abolition of the spoils system would restrain, quiet, and purify the contest itself.

That this statement respecting the operation of the general-ticket system is not overdrawn will appear by a recurrence to a few well-known events. The election for State officers, which Pennsylvania formerly held a few weeks before the Presidential election, was regarded as almost decisive upon the vote of the whole Union. There is very little doubt that the small majority which that State gave in her October election of 1856 for the Democratic candidates practically settled the Presidential election in the following November. The certainty almost established thereby that her twenty-eight electoral votes would be given to Mr. Buchanan had such an effect upon a highly excited and impressible community, upon the fears of one side and the hopes of the other, as well as upon the timid and self-seeking everywhere, that the national election was substantially given up in the other thirty States. In the late Presidential contest, does any one doubt that if the State elections in Ohio and Indiana had gone for one and the same party, whichever it was, the certainty how their thirty-seven electoral votes

would go would have settled the question for the whole nation? The general government cannot prevent States holding their State elections at such times as make them tentative and significant of the Presidential election; and although the two elections, with their expense of money, time, and excitement, are injurious to the citizens of the States, and many States have abandoned them, still other States have held to them against the interest of their citizens, for the sake of the political power which is thus given to their public men and to the managers of their political machinery. Everything must be done for Maine, Indiana, and Ohio, nothing must be refused them, because they vote by general ticket in November, and their September and October elections will settle and proclaim their Presidential vote.

The effect of the general-ticket system is seen in the bearing of the public men, and, still worse, of the electioneering managers from a few great States, in Congress, and especially at about the time of the Presidential nominating conventions. It is due to the public men of great States that they should receive high consideration and wield a large influence, because of the magnitude of the interests and the number of citizens they especially represent. These they will have, whatever may be the form of voting for President. But under the present system they have an undue influence from artificial causes. The Republican or Democratic Senator from a mammoth State walks about with the possible thirty or forty Presidential votes of his State in his pocket, and

“Doth bestride the narrow world  
Like a Colossus.”

Nor he alone, but every electioneering manager from a great State, whose function and capacity are solely that of marshaling or creating the hundreds or thousands of votes in his great city or district, which may be decisive of the entire national election, may, without one qualification of a statesman, have a personal prestige, and a power over all questions of policy and patronage, which it is a shame to contemplate and a peril to permit. Nay, further, every inhabitant of a great State who has any local influence, just or unjust, honest or dishonest, which may be thought to affect even a few hundred voters in his immediate locality, becomes by this unjust contrivance a possible arbiter of the fate of the nation.

Few seem to have thought much of the effect of this system on

the public policy of the country. If Congress has before it some question of public policy affecting branches of industry, which ought to be settled upon general principles, the public argument made before the committee of the House will probably be upon principle, but what is the private argument of the interested parties who buttonhole the committee-men and members of the House? "Recollect my State votes by general ticket, and throws a tenth or a fifteenth part of the vote of the country, and does it by very small majorities. Last year my district furnished a bigger majority for our side than we got in the whole State. Now, if you don't care for that majority in the coming Presidential election, very well; but if you do, you had better not touch the thirteenth article of the tariff bill." Now, if that State voted by districts, this man's majority would settle but one electoral vote, and perhaps affect the two electoral votes at large; and his argument would be weighed accordingly. It is the general-ticket system alone which gives this small, worthless personage such disproportionate power, whether over Congress in matters of legislation, or over the President and the executive departments in questions of patronage.

These disproportionate powers and influences, so wielded, are also felt in the national conventions for nominations of Presidents, and in all the contests within the party which precede and follow these conventions, and in all the dealings with patronage and appointments, high or low, prospective or in hand.

Thus it has come to pass that the selection of candidates and election of President, instead of being a power and function spread as equally as possible over the whole country, is reduced to a few great centres, where the political machinery of the few great States is in play. It has been converted from a corporation of generally diffused and pretty equally divided stock, on which each shareholder has a vote, into a lottery where a few great prizes control and absorb the entire scheme.

It is true that the States can return to the system of voting by single districts without the necessity of an amendment to the Constitution, the manner of appointing electors being at their control. But there is no probability that they will do so. The great States are not likely to lead off in it, and the smaller States will hold on to the little power they have, as their protection. No



State likes to begin. It is the case of the proposal of a general disarmament,—“*Que messieurs les assassins commencent.*” Practically, therefore, an amendment to the Constitution is necessary, which will prohibit the election of the whole college by general ticket.

Wisdom upon this subject may be drawn from the case of the election of members of Congress. The Constitution left that subject with the States, in the absence of legislation by Congress. The politicians in some of the States soon saw the power they and their States would gain, in all parts and aspects of political authority, if they could introduce a general-ticket system in the election of members of the House. To be sure, it was something like the gambler's stake, win all or lose all ; but it was the magnitude of the stake which gave the importance to those who should be playing the game. New Hampshire, New Jersey, and even as large a State as Georgia chose their entire delegation to Congress by general ticket. The political minority, however large, was unrepresented, and the political influence of the State and of the persons ruling it was increased in importance indefinitely. However unjust the method, competition and self-defence would have caused it to spread rapidly, and we might have seen the scandal of the largest States sending unanimous delegations to Congress, elected by ever so small a majority or plurality in the State at large. But Congress, in 1847, under the power reserved to it by the Constitution, interfered and required that representatives should be elected by single districts. It having no such power to regulate the choice of electors, the only practical remedy is, as we have said, by an amendment of the Constitution.

#### *The Electoral Colleges.*

If the Constitution is to be amended, the first question in logical order, though not, as we think, in intrinsic importance, is whether the electoral colleges shall be retained? There are men of eminence who think they should be retained, on the ground that if their action is only formal they are not a serious inconvenience, and that a time may come when the people may be willing to resort to them, in the manner intended originally, as the real selectors as well as electors of the President. But we see not the least probability of this. Their intended function of selectors of the Presi-

dent broke down the first time there was a contested election. In 1800 the Democratic party, through the press and popular meetings, had designated Jefferson as their candidate for President and Burr for Vice-President, and so literally did the electors carry out the will of the party, that every Democratic elector voted for those two candidates, so as to make a tie, as the manner of voting then was. This caused the Amendment of 1804. From that time on, the electors have not pretended to select the President. The respective parties have selected their candidates, and the contest at the polls has been practically between such two candidates, the forms of the Constitution being preserved by the people choosing between two sets of electors, designated by the two parties and pledged to vote for the respective candidates. We may digress a moment to reflect upon the extraordinary nature of this proceeding. Not only is it a most striking illustration of the essential superiority of human instincts and will over prepared constitutions, observing their forms scrupulously, but reversing their spirit and purpose absolutely ; but it is a remarkable proof of the manner in which, under certain circumstances, faith is kept with the people. For seventy-six years, that is, for nineteen Presidential elections, no member of an electoral college has failed to vote for the candidate designated by his party, or been subjected to the imputation of being open to any influences in that direction. Yet the party takes from the elector no written pledge, and indeed exacts no oral pledge. From the fact that he is nominated by his party as a Presidential elector, the party having first designated whom it wishes to have made President, he comes under the implied obligation to vote for that candidate, and to disregard the obligation the Constitution intends to put upon him of selecting and voting for a President according to his own judgment. The number of electors who during this period have so kept faith with their parties must have been between three and four thousand.

To return to the line of our argument. The machinery of electoral colleges not only complicates the process of election, but, in our judgment, gives greater scope for fraud than would a direct vote by the people. It is true that the colleges of electors have been composed of eminently respectable men. There is a certain air of dignity which surrounds the post, although its functions have become purely formal. When such is the case, and there is no

power, profit, or patronage involved, we may ordinarily rely upon seeing a row of respectable figure-heads. But suppose the system had worked as intended; suppose these colleges, of limited numbers, meeting in secret session, and protected, as far as could be, from outside inquiry or knowledge, had the actual power of making the original selection and designation of the President, and then to dissolve without having any other function to perform, and with no field for the exercise of those powers and qualities by which fame or popularity is to be gained. How long would such assemblies have remained incorrupt? As the experiment has never been tried, the answer is a matter of opinion. But we cannot repress the fear that in time they would have become the most corrupt and most detested functionaries in the whole line of our government. Far better is the open nomination by popular conventions, with all the objections to which they are subject, and the open election by the people, than would have been, as we believe, the results of the secret collegiate elections, when brought down to such times as these, and subjected to such influences as have beset the politics of this country for many years past.

*Direct Popular Vote for President, Counted by Federal Numbers.*

Assuming, then, that, if the Constitution is amended, the choice by electors is abandoned, and a direct popular choice substituted, in what form shall it be cast? There have always been suggestions of a direct vote of the whole people of the country, irrespective of States, counted in the aggregate. But we cannot think such a proposition will receive even serious consideration by Congress or by any convention. It is sufficient that it sets aside State rights in the election, and what we are accustomed to call the Federal numbers, provided for the security of those rights. The requisite three fourths of the States are not likely to surrender their privileges and leave everything to the force of mere numbers, counted by the head. Besides this, such a vote would be an ordeal to which we ought not to subject anything in itself so full of dangers as the popular election of a single executive head, — in plain words, the maintenance of an elective limited monarchy.

We have been objecting that, by the general-ticket system in the choice of electors, the area of the operation of a fraud is extended from a district to an entire State, from the choice of one

elector to the choice of thirty or forty. But under the plan of simple direct voting, counted in the aggregate, the area for the operation of every fraud or mistake would be the whole Republic. The result of every such illegal act would go directly into the aggregate vote of the whole country. The temptation to procure or commit any form of illegal act now known or hereafter to be invented will be increased to the highest power known to political algebra, and no redress will be adequate. Without saying that we do not believe that our system would stand the shock, it is enough to say that there is no excuse for subjecting it to such a test. The only course that remains seems to be that of the people voting directly for President, but counting the votes in accordance with Federal numbers, that is, by States and single districts.

To be more explicit, the plan is that each citizen of a State vote directly for the candidate for President whom he prefers. The candidate having the plurality of votes in the whole State will be credited with two electoral votes, and the candidate having the plurality of votes in any district will be credited with one electoral vote for each district which he carries. The result is, that the plurality in each State counts two electoral votes, and the plurality in each district counts one vote. In the last election, for instance, Mr. Tilden would have had two votes from the State of New York at large, and Mr. Hayes would have divided with him the thirty-three Congressional districts, according as one or the other had the plurality of votes in each; while in Ohio, Mr. Hayes would have had the two electoral votes at large, and the votes of the districts would have been divided upon the same principle. In short, this process gives to each State two electoral votes corresponding to its two Senators, and as many district votes as it has members of the House of Representatives, and will require the latter vote to be counted by single districts. This method, hinted at by Story, in his "Commentaries," but receiving little attention, is revived by Senator Morton, in his proposal to amend the Constitution, and we believe that to this part of his proposal no serious objection has been offered. We believe it to be the very best security that can be proposed to the country in the exercise of its right to the periodical choice of its chief magistrate.

*Term of Office and Re-eligibility.*

We are strongly of opinion that the term should be extended, — not to a great length, not beyond six or seven years. The truth is, the process of king-making is a very exciting process in this Republic. What is popularly called the campaign lasts six months, and, including the preparations for the national conventions for nominating candidates, absorbs public attention one year out of four, and destroys every fourth term of Congress, and that always the long term, for useful legislation. It is not for the interests of the people at large that the air should always be surcharged with electioneering, and that the work of preparing themselves for elections and attending the polls, as well as the inevitable primary meetings and ante-primary meetings and conventions, should take up a large portion of the time of working and business men, whether in professions or in trades, mechanics or laborers, who have families to support and private duties to themselves and others and public duties not political, in abundance, to discharge. The more frequent and complex the elections become, the more the private citizen is disfranchised, and the whole passes into the hands of electioneering experts, the chief of the dangerous classes in this country. A citizen needs a breathing time in which he can think of other things, a period of repose. The choice of a member of Congress every other year, of a Senator through his legislature, on the average about as often, and the choice of some or all State and municipal officers annually or biennially, will be quite enough for him to do, quite enough to keep alive his political faculties and supply him with political information.

It must be expected that all attempts to make elections less frequent and more simple will meet the opposition of electioneering experts and men whose daily life lies in and whose daily bread depends upon what they are pleased to call politics. Such men depend upon frequent elections, as pickpockets depend upon frequent crowds. If the people themselves can once make a successful revolt against the tyranny of these low-toned and low-bred oligarchs, the country may have peace and repose, the vote of a private citizen will have responsibility and power, and the trade of the electioneering brokers and middlemen will suffer a diminution of power and profits.

We cannot but think that the effect of an enlarged term would be

good upon the President himself, but we think that with this term he should not be re-eligible. He will take the office with the knowledge that his term of six or seven years is secured to him, and that he cannot look for a second term. It is hardly possible to conceive of a position more likely to call out the best qualities of a man who has anything noble in his disposition, or who is even capable of growing up to an unwonted elevation of thought and motive. This tenure will relieve the President from that suspicion and distrust which always besets the last year of his first term of office,—that he is manœuvring for his own re-election. The objection made to the prohibition of his re-election is that the country may need him for further service. The country had to do without Washington, after eight years, and is not likely to be more severely tried again. But public opinion soon settled into the belief that it was better for the country, on the whole, to be trained in the knowledge that the term of the President's service, whoever he may be, is limited, and far better for that officer himself.

As the reader will see, we do not purpose to consider the forms or details of amendments, but only to point out the ends intended to be secured by the amendments.

### *The Ascertaining of the Vote.*

It is quite possible that some provision may be made respecting the ascertaining the Presidential vote. The mere counting of acknowledged returns of votes, as an arithmetical process, requires only security against mistake or fraud. For that, surely, publicity, the general knowledge of results through the press, and the presence of the two houses of Congress, must be sufficient. The difficulty arises only where the question of accepting or rejecting votes depends upon some question of public law, or upon the ascertainment of the real vote of the people of the States and districts, when the votes are alleged to have been in fact different from the returns by which the electoral vote is to be counted.

Whatever provision may be made, we trust it will not be one in any way involving the Supreme Court of the United States. That Court stands in high respect. One reason of this, and the principal one, is the popular confidence that it is substantially separated from party politics. Its hold upon the public is purely moral. It is vital to our system that that hold should not be impaired. The

Supreme Court should remain what the Constitution has made it, simply a *court*, that is, a tribunal for the decision of actually litigated cases. Even in the decision of such cases, questions may be involved upon which political parties have divided. That is an accident which cannot be provided against. Even in such cases the strain upon the Court is perceptible through the country, and certainly furnishes a warning against compelling the Court to decide a question, not of legal litigation, but one which directly awards to one or the other of the great political parties of the country the sentence of defeat or success in the most heated of all controversies, a contest for the control of public policy and the possession of public patronage.

If the ascertaining of the vote is not given to the judicial department, it would seem that it must rest with Congress; for it is hardly supposable that any third tribunal can be organized which would be satisfactory. This brings up the great question how far the national government shall go in its investigations. Shall it have the unlimited powers which each house of Congress possesses, in case of contested seats, or shall the first steps taken within the States be settled by the States themselves? To the unlimited powers of inquiry by Congress, the practical objections are very great. Imagine to ourselves committees of Congress investigating the votes of individual citizens and the voting-lists in a dozen or more States of the Union, to decide upon the qualification of individual voters, the charges of local frauds or errors, to contradict the returns of the State officers! Picture to ourselves the majority and minority reports those committees will make, and the debates which will take place upon them in both branches of Congress! If it takes a single branch of Congress six months to determine the right of a single member to his seat, how long will it take both branches to make satisfactory inquiries into the qualifications of all the voters in the Union whose rights may be challenged, into all frauds charged, into all errors or intimidations suggested, and into the proceedings of all State officials which are impeached, and how long to decide between the conflicting reports in which these inquiries will mostly result? When shall we have a President by these methods?

But a more serious question is, What confidence will the public place in the result at last? The inquiries into the right to seats

in Congress are notoriously decided, except in obvious cases, by party vote. If the virtue of Congressmen has not been found sufficient to adjudge the right to a single seat which may not affect the scale of power in the House, what confidence can be placed in their decision which will determine the possession of the national administration for four years? This is no time for complaisance. The people would not trust their decision,—Congress would not trust it themselves. The exercise of these functions would increase the political electioneering power of Congress, demoralize it as a legislative assembly, and make it, more than it has ever yet been, an irresponsible electioneering tribunal from whose decision there can be no appeal. It would also greatly increase the central power, at the expense of State rights, and give new impetus to that centripetal force which is already alarmingly great.

In view of these dangers and objections, would it not be better to leave the earlier steps in the election to be taken upon the responsibility of the States themselves, and decided by their authority? It may be said that the State tribunals may be guilty of fraud, may make mistakes of law and fact, may be influenced by party spirit, and may permit and even encourage violence and intimidation upon the voters. Doubtless all this, or much of this, may be true. But we must remember that our safety consists in the distribution of all those powers among the States which it is not essential to have conferred upon the Republic. We must therefore accept the chances of the faults and failures of the States. And it may well be asked whether faults and failures distributed among forty States, counterbalancing one another, would be so great an evil as the failure of justice at the one central tribunal of last resort. And, speaking of frauds, accidents, and mistakes in the giving and counting of votes or in passing upon returns, shall we escape them by transferring the control and investigations from the State tribunals and people to Congressional committees of inquiry? When this great stake of the Presidency is played for, we must expect frauds and attempts at frauds, occasional sporadic violence and intimidation, and the unavoidable results of a suffrage embracing so much of ignorance and debased moral sense. We do not attempt to define the line of demarcation, but we believe it is possible to establish a distinction sufficiently clear to govern Congress and the States in the exercise of



their respective functions, expecting perfection of neither, but trusting to the results of that distribution of powers and consequent lessening of the dangers of the abuse of powers, upon which our federative system rests.

The questions we have been considering relate to the votes of States assumed to have the right of voting. The far greater and deeper question, whether a State is in condition to exercise this function at all, is necessarily determined by the Republic. But the exclusion of a State should be passed upon by the Republic in its highest function of political legislation, by the combined action of both houses, approved by the President in his legislative capacity, with all the guaranties and solemnities that surround legislation, and not as a mere incident to the counting of votes and as part of that process.

### *Civil-Service Reform.*

Passing from questions of constitutional changes, we will consider the most prominent matters of legislative and executive policy pending before the country. Of these, there is one which goes deeper into the political life of the nation than any other, and affects more seriously the character and destiny of the Republic, — this is Civil-Service Reform. It has been talked about, written about, commended by legislative resolves and executive declarations, and adopted into the platforms of parties and the letters of candidates, but has been played with and evaded and misunderstood to quite an equal extent. By civil service reform is meant the change of the system upon which that service is administered. It means the abolition of the spoils system and its necessary consequences. It means the disengaging of our civil service from the baleful effects of that infamous maxim, "To the victors belong the spoils." Anything less than this is mere playing upon words, mere political trading upon phrases which the vilest demagogues and seekers and dividers of spoils may use without inconsistency. It does not mean the reforming in of one set of office-holders and the reforming out of another. We have had this kind of reform in constant operation since the inauguration of General Jackson, and the more there is of it the deeper become the ruts in which the great machine for the disposing of party plunder moves. It does not mean the putting out of unfit men and the putting in of fit men, at the

discretion of the party in power. That is something which never has been and never can be done, for the standard of fitness has been and always will be that which determines party preferment within the ranks of the party itself. The history of our civil service explains the needed reform. It is a familiar fact that Mr. Jefferson introduced the principle of party tenure, although he applied it to a small extent and in a very moderate degree. When he said that the majority of the people were Democrats, that he found nearly all of the executive offices held by Federalists (meaning the non-political and merely ministerial or clerical offices), that the Democrats ought to have a reasonable share of these offices, and that, as vacancies by death were few, by resignations none, he must remove some Federalists, as such, to make room for some Democrats, as such, he admitted the principle of the spoils system, that is, that the offices whose duties men of one party can discharge as well as men of the other party are personal gifts, to which party fidelity in the electioneering struggle gives a title, and from which the best officer may be ejected on the sole ground of difference in political opinion. The inevitable tendency of this doctrine, if allowed to have its way, was pointed out in the celebrated remonstrance of the citizens of New Haven, written, we believe, by the late Chief Justice Daggett, on the occasion of the removal of the postmaster of that place. Mr. Jefferson, without disclaiming the principle upon which the removal rested, offered assurances of his intention to exercise the power with all the fairness and justice of which it admitted. But it was something entirely beyond personal control. When once received into the system, it necessarily spread through it, became chronic, grew worse with time, and requires the most thorough treatment, with no less a purpose than its extirpation from the political system.

Until General Jackson's administration, there was no such change of parties as called for the exercise of this plan of proscription and reward; and his predecessor, Mr. Adams, who was thoroughly opposed to the spoils system, made but two removals during his four years, and both for cause, allowing opponents to his re-election to retain their offices without inquiry into their political opinions. General Jackson, with the thoroughgoing and imperious qualities of his nature, carried out to the full the system of proscription and reward, based solely upon party services. The inevitable results in

demoralizing the public service were pointed out, especially by the late Judge McLean, of the Supreme Court; but, having tasted of the spoil, the ravenous capacity of office-seekers and the selfish strategy of party leaders were developed to the utmost. The Whig party, in its victory of 1840, had not the virtue — perhaps it had not the strength — to take the noble position open to it, of renouncing the spoils system altogether at the moment it came into their hands. It made no attempt in that direction. The policy, having been thus followed by both parties, has become settled upon the country. Its evils have become developed even beyond the prediction of its most far-seeing opponents. Omitting those few high offices which it is conceded should be held by the tenure of general sympathy with the administration, and intending by the civil service that vast catalogue of offices with which party opinions have no proper connection, it may be now said that the tenure of the civil service is party fidelity. This were bad enough. But it is more. It is personal fidelity in the political and electioneering service of the member of Congress who procured the tenant his office, and has or may have the power to remove him. This secret power affects the families and friends of office-holders, and the underlings, the very boys that sweep out the office. The opinions of their parents are searched into, and notice is given if action, or at least silence, is required of them. The distribution of this vast patronage is well understood to be, with a few exceptions where the President or the head of the department has a strong wish, in the hands of the member of Congress of the dominant party for the district in which the office is exercised. Senators, by a perversion of their power of confirmation, exercise a vast control over all patronage, the exact lines of which, as between themselves, the heads of departments, and the members of the lower house, are imperfectly defined. The limits of senatorial intervention cannot be laid down. A common law or usage respecting the division of spoils has obtained some growth, and is to some degree respected between the members of the two houses, as to the offices within each State. It is enough to say, in general, that each office-holder through the country understands that he holds his office upon the terms, mainly and substantially, not only of party fidelity, but of active service at caucuses, conventions, and in his daily conversation and business, to promote the personal interests and aspirations of some politician

in one or the other branch of Congress. It has become a base and servile tenure, unworthy of the citizen of a free republic. It tends to lower the tone of all the holders of office and of all citizens who are the spectators of such a relation. The effect upon the members of Congress is quite as bad. It nurses a love of power over individuals. It accustoms them to look to the selfishness of men, their fears and their cupidity, as the sources of their own influence and the means of their advancement. It occupies a large portion of their time, to the exclusion of their proper public service. It leads them to believe that their re-election or promotion depends more upon the manner in which they have managed their patronage than upon the part they have taken and the labors they have performed in the service of the nation. Mr. Mundella, the radical member of Parliament for Sheffield, a strong friend of our institutions, told us, at the Cooper Institute, on taking leave of the country, that he thought its great danger lay in the corrupting effect of our civil service. It had surprised, shocked, and alarmed him. He said that, having perhaps the largest constituency in England, he had not a voice in the appointment of a tide-waiter, that in Parliament he had only to attend to the legislative and administrative duties of a member, and that his re-election depended upon the manner in which his constituents regarded his public service.

It may be said that, assuming our statements to be substantially true, they are generally accepted, and that nothing is of any value except the suggestion of some specific plan of reform. We do not believe this to be the case. The difficulty lies in the unwillingness to give up the spoils system. It is expecting a good deal of the virtue of members of Congress that they should be willing to surrender this patronage. They must be forced to it by an overruling public opinion. The great mass of men who have spent a lifetime in learning to run the political machine by the spoils system must lose the fruits of their labors, and retire to private life, and begin the unaccustomed business of earning a living by legitimate work of their own. The multitude of office-seekers through the country have always looked to this system, and will with difficulty accommodate themselves to any other. Public opinion must be created intelligent enough to know exactly where the evil lies, what it is that must be changed, and what result is to be looked for, with a moral sense sufficiently awakened to feel the moral dangers as well as the ignominy of our present situation.

If our civil service were divorced from electioneering, how great and beneficent would be the effect upon every election! Let any one ask himself, as to our Presidential elections, what portion of the excitement, expenditure of time and money, and useless and costly demonstrations, is to be attributed to the struggle for the retention of office, and for obtaining office in the civil service. What portion of the corruption and of those various demoralizing labors, known by the names of pipe-laying and log-rolling, capturing and managing of caucuses and conventions, is attributable to this system of rewards and punishments? How largely has it controlled our State and municipal elections, for no reasons affecting State or municipal policy, but only for the purpose of controlling their patronage? If this divorce can be secured, our elections will turn far more upon the pros and cons of public measures and upon the merits of candidates. The potentates of the custom-house and the post-office must dismiss their pretorian guards and corps of janissaries, paid from the public Treasury for personal services, and make room for men employed and paid, upon business principles, for the performance of the duties of their office, and none other.

If the people of the country come to a full knowledge and deep sense of the demoralizing effect of the spoils system, they will demand its abandonment and the substitution of a system by which the business of the Republic shall be intrusted to men whose tenure of office, however long or short, shall be an independent one; who need fear nothing but official misconduct or disability; who need no longer watch the smiles and tremble at the frowns of the member from the district or his electioneering agents; who need not fear the reproach of being any man's political body-servant; who may stand erect in the consciousness that they have been appointed, upon their merits, to perform certain specific public services, for a known compensation, for an established term of time, with the right to think and vote on public questions as their intelligence and conscience shall dictate.

We do not think that public opinion has acquired the force to insist upon this reform, against interests and habits so firmly established, and against the influence of the masses of our most selfish, skilful, power-loving and active politicians. We think the best service we can render, in an article like this, is rather to attempt to aid in advancing such a public opinion than by

suggesting modes and methods of carrying out such a reform, before the need of it shall have become sufficiently felt and the demand for it sufficiently strong.

*Seats of Cabinet Ministers in the two Houses.*

Few of those who have interested themselves in this subject seem to be aware what a revolution will be made in our entire political system by the adoption of this change. They point to England, as if members of the Cabinet there had officially seats in Parliament. But this is not so. No Cabinet minister has a seat in Parliament as such, and a member of Parliament vacates his seat by accepting a place in the Cabinet. But he may be re-elected, notwithstanding his seat in the Cabinet. The truth is, that in England the Cabinets are formed from members of Parliament. The Ministry is a kind of standing committee of the two houses, to carry on the government under their sight, subject to their daily observation, obliged to report and to explain to them in person, *viva voce*, all the measures of legislation and administration in which they are engaged. And whenever this committee of the two houses cannot command their support, it is unmade, and a new committee of members substituted. We state this in a rough way, as the substantial result of the condition of things in England, aware that the formalities and ceremonies give it to a common observer a somewhat different appearance. But no analogy can be drawn from the British Parliament to our Congress. Parliament governs the British Empire in administration as well as legislation, subject to no constitution and no objection to its acts by any judicial tribunal, and does all this through a Ministry which has become in fact its committee,—Parliament being all the while supreme in legislation and administration. What analogy can be drawn from that system to our own, composed of three independent departments of government, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial? If we have made a mistake in separating the legislative from the executive, and in giving the executive a tenure independent of the legislative,—in other words, in reversing the British system,—we can correct it only by a reconstruction of our whole frame of government from the beginning. It is easy to see the advantages of having ministers in the two houses to explain and defend the measures of the government, but are we

prepared for the consequences? Are we willing that these ministers appointed by the President shall frame and initiate measures in Congress? Do we intend that they shall resign if they are out-voted, and that the President shall appoint a new Cabinet in harmony with the majority of Congress? If we do, what becomes of the Presidential prerogative? Will not the person chosen by the people to administer an independent executive department, with a veto power over acts of Congress, become a mere name and form; the Cabinet leader in Congress becoming the principal figure before the people; the President following his advice, as does the Queen that of her minister; and Congress, by its control over the Ministry, becoming supreme in administration as well as legislation? It may do for England to trust herself entirely to Parliament. She has done so up to this time without apprehension, or perhaps reason for any, because in that supreme council is gathered and continued for life (practically in the Commons as well as in the Lords) all that England has of political experience, public distinction, popular favor, and stake in the community, of rank, wealth, landed estate, and leading positions in trade, agriculture, and manufactures. There, too, are her eminent judges and lawyers, and all the foremost of her naval and military commanders. It is an assembly the composition of which has never been approached or likened in the world's history. The British system is absolute parliamentary government, and England must needs have in that assembly every element of wisdom the Empire can furnish, experience in all departments of public service, and the greatest stake in all the forms of wealth and industry in the country, and a membership which shall be the highest object of pride to the British subject. The fate of England depends upon the character and composition of her Parliament. We, on the other hand, have not, and have determined that we will not have, and without a radical revolution, including the destruction of the States, can never have, such an assembly. As a democratic Republic, we have trusted to the distribution of powers between the States and the Republic, and between the different departments of the government in each, and not to the concentration in one assembly of all the conservatism, political intelligence and experience, fame, *éclat*, and stake in the wealth and industry of the land. Indeed, it is a contradiction of terms to suppose an assembly in

this Republic fit to be intrusted with parliamentary government, and at the same time to maintain the separation of the legislative from the executive department, and to preserve to the States their full powers and dignities. Where are the distinguished men, the great judges and lawyers, the great captains on sea or on land, the great merchants, manufacturers, agriculturists, the philosophers and men of letters, — the men who most fill the public eye? Some of them are occasionally in the Senate, others in the executive service at home or abroad, and large numbers are in the public service of the several States. This is as it should be under our system, which is one of dispersion, rotation, and distribution. We exclude a large part of our most eminent citizens, and we prohibit all officials, State or national, from seats in Congress. The members of the lower house are practically, though not by law, limited to representing the districts in which they live, consequently the lower house is an assembly of little else than ephemeral, district men, mostly of district reputations. No American who has thought at all deeply upon his country's institutions would dare to confide to such a body greater powers than it now possesses.

It will be said that no such serious change is intended. Doubtless not. Yet we cannot but think that either the proposed measure will entirely fail, or Congress will gain through it a great accession of power, the Presidential office be shorn of its strength, the independence of the executive bureaucracy be seriously impaired, and its great function lost.

#### *Resumption of Specie Payments.*

This subject has been so fully discussed heretofore in this Review, and so presented to the public by the press and pamphlets, and by speeches in Congress and before the people, that a repetition of the arguments would be inexcusable. It is not a want of understanding of the subject, so much as it is a reluctance to perform a hard duty, that stands and has always stood in the way. Soon after the close of the war, certain prominent politicians, distrusting the people, as demagogues always do, at the most vital point, that is, their moral sense and intelligence, thought they could ride into power on the wave of public opinion by advocating the payment of the national debt in paper promises to pay. They relied upon the maxim which one of their leaders quoted with approval: "The



public conscience is never awakened by crimes from which the public itself expects to reap some advantage." The public was more honest and intelligent than they supposed, and the national credit was saved. The next attempt of the same class of men was to defraud the national creditors by laying what they called a tax, of ten per cent, upon the interest to be paid on our bonds. This form of repudiation was also rejected by the people. Substantially the same class of politicians have been found opposing the return to specie payments. With some, this is sustained by the theory that the government's promises need not be based upon specie at all; that they may rest entirely upon the vague notion that they command the whole wealth of the country. Doubtless some men of a theorizing turn of mind, not drilled in practical life, may actually believe in this proposition. But with the practical electioneering politicians we believe it to have been put forward, *quantum valeat*, to cover the practical measure of delaying payment. The objection to specie payment is put forward now almost entirely in behalf of what is commonly called the debtor class, that is, those persons who, having contracted a debt at a lower rate in the value of paper, fear that they must pay it at a higher rate. The injustice and fallacy of this proposition have been repeatedly exposed. Ever since the Legal Tender Act had its natural effect, private promises to pay in the future (except in special contracts to pay bullion as merchandise) have had a speculative value. Both parties to the contract knew that at the time of payment the paper in which it would be made might be worth a great deal more or a great deal less than when the contract was made. Each side took its risk of profit or loss coming from that consideration. All persons engaged in business have known that the market value of the government paper, though with occasional and slight fluctuations, has been steadily rising toward the value of the specie which it nominally represents. It has been matter of speculative opinion among business men whether and how soon it would of itself rise to the value of gold. An act of Congress fixed the time for the resumption of specie payments at January 1, 1879, giving five years' notice to all the world. Under such circumstances there is no reason in the cry that a resumption of payments in specie in 1879 will work injustice upon those who have debts to pay. All these things enter into the motives and considerations of buyer and seller, lender and borrower.

Besides, it must be remembered that the Act for resumption of specie payments is not the measure of a party, but the deed of the country. Our system is government by majorities. The President and the Congress, when elected and instituted into office and in the performance of its public functions, are the agents of the Republic. Whatever they do, within the scope of their authority, partaking of the nature of a promise or an offer on which people have a right to rely, binds the whole country, and must be performed as treaties are performed, irrespective of changes of majority, or, if necessarily abrogated, must be abrogated upon terms consistent with equity and the honor of the country. The public has learned that there is not only a sufficiency but a surplus of government paper in circulation for the business needs of the country, that the issuing of more paper would be folly; and even the most ignorant have come to understand that government paper is not a gift to be equally distributed among communities, but a value which will go only where it is paid for; and there is very little doubt remaining that it is the conviction of the business men of the country that it is fully in our power to secure a return to specie payments by the time designated without any extraordinary strain upon the country, or any other loss to one class of dealers or gain to another than each has taken the risk of and has been bound to prepare for.

*Relations of the Republic with the late Rebel States.*

Nothing is weaker in statesmanship than indulgence in wishes and afterthoughts. The nation has completed its work of reconstruction, and that has become a part of the settled public law of the country. It has been based upon the equal rights of all, with the gift of the unlimited right of suffrage to the whole body of emancipated slaves, in all their ignorance, weakness, credulity, and brutishness. And we have restored to the exercise of their civil and political franchises the men who but a few years ago were belligerent and bitter enemies of the Republic, the masters of those slaves whom they were determined to hold in subjection, and the advocates and propagators of a slave system, to which they pledged their lives and fortunes, and for which they stood up bravely against the sword, famine, and penury. We early readmitted these States, with such populations and under such influences, to the full exercise of their functions as States internally, and in the administration

of the Republic. If the emancipated slaves did not enter upon the discharge of their political duties mainly ignorant, timid, credulous, and brutish, then slavery was not what we have always believed and represented it to be. If the late masters did not cherish a great deal of resentment against the flag and arms of the Republic, which overthrew their cherished system and brought them down from their proud position as a master race, ruling over four millions of slaves, and holding the substantial political control over the entire Republic; if they have not the desire to regain, in such form as they may, something of their old prestige, then we have been equally mistaken as to the effect of slavery upon the masters. If the result of two hundred years of slaveholding has been the transforming of millions of pagan African negroes into persons capable of at once entering upon the duties of citizens of a republic, capable of administering its complex affairs with skill, patience, and intelligence, or of selecting their own rulers and representatives with judgment, insight, and forecast, we ought frankly to acknowledge that our opposition to slavery was a mistake, and that we should have encouraged instead of restricting its propagation and progress. Believing that we were not mistaken in any of those positions, and having established reconstruction upon those principles, as to which perhaps the genius of our institutions left us no choice, we were bound to contemplate and be prepared for the consequences. The truth is, the antipathies and collisions between the races, and the resentment of the master class against the Republic, have been less than we might well have anticipated. It is true that the ignorance and credulity of the blacks have made them the dupes of the worst of white adventurers from the North, and the two together have brought many of the States into bankruptcy and disgrace. It is not for us to complain, or affect surprise, if the sudden possession of so much power and influence by the late slaves, their sudden transfer from unpaid labor and the crack of the driver's whip to seats in senates and at the receipts of customs, has quite turned the heads and overturned the principles of the best of them. If the large portion of the "mean whites," headed by the worst of the late slavemasters, have taken again to the handling of the knives and guns, in the free use of which they were brought up, and which were necessary to the control of their slaves in the last resort, and use them now to secure their

own political supremacy, it is childish in us to complain, and act as if we were taken by surprise. If a dominant race of educated whites finds it difficult to bear the experience of being outvoted by their late slaves, and of having their small remaining properties mortgaged for public debts contracted by ignorance and fraud, and impatiently takes to unlawful methods of redress, it is no more than should have been foreseen by that common knowledge of human nature which every man, holding himself out as a statesman, is bound to possess. Further, while it is true that the late master race did at the beginning, in their pride and folly, refuse that share of public duties which the reconstruction allowed them, it was no unnatural effect of such a state of affairs upon such tempers as must result from generations of slaveholding. Bound to have foreseen all this, we have embarked upon this plan of reconstruction, and we must carry out the experiment in accordance with the system of the Republic, which is the planetary system, or our system and institutions will disappear together. The States must act with the full powers of States, and the Republic must abide the consequences, unless their action reaches to the point of what is actually and *bona fide* civil war, or insurrection which cannot be repressed by the authorities of the State. There has been no ground given for fear that any part of the South will rise in insurrection against the Republic. The cases of violence presented, frightful enough, have yet been sporadic, local, and relating to State affairs. Extreme care should be used in applying the military power of the Republic in such cases as these. It is better that the States should learn by sad experience, it is better that we all should suffer, than that the balance should be impaired or destroyed in which the elements of our confederate Republic are held together.

There seem to us to be dangers from two sources so long as this antipathy of races and the struggle between them for political power shall have enough of strength remaining to make it an instrument in the party politics of the Republic. As the history of the political parties has been, it is natural that the manœuvring leaders of one side should turn to the blacks, and the other to the whites, with faces full of sympathy and hands full of ballots. It is natural that each side should exaggerate the patience and forbearance of their supporters and the incapacity and evil deeds of

their opponents. In this state of things it is hard to get trustworthy information. The main practical question is, when the military power of the Republic shall be invoked, and how far it shall be used. If the State governments come to understand that they can have the Federal troops as a police whenever they are in trouble, if they but cast their request in the form required by the Constitution, they will lose the habit and capacity of exercising State government at all. The spectacle of the bayonets of a different dynasty in the legislative halls, judicial chambers, and voting-rooms of a State, though that dynasty be our own and of which we are citizens, officers, and subjects, is not and should never become an agreeable or a tolerable spectacle. We have seen those bayonets used in Kansas to force a slave constitution upon an antislavery people, and in Boston to draw chains around the State court-house and enforce the surrender of a fugitive slave, for which the marshal was abundantly able to provide, while the police of the city and the militia of the State were abundantly able to preserve peace; but we had hoped that such things were the natural results of the rule of the slave power and would pass away with it. In England no part of the regular army is permitted to remain within a certain distance of the voting-places, or to stand guard over deliberative assemblies; and when the Chartists were to march, as they proclaimed, by tens of thousands to the House of Commons to present their revolutionary petition, the Duke of Wellington, in whose hands the preservation of the public peace was placed, while he lined the streets with a special police of the best citizens, organized for the purpose, did not permit a soldier of the regular army to be seen, although they were so stationed that they could be brought in at the last, if the procession had ended in a mob, and all civil methods of repression had failed. This was a tribute to the liberty-loving instincts of the masses of the English people. Our people should never deaden these instincts, and to that end our rulers should respect them to the utmost. If a case arises where the despatch of Federal troops to a State of the Union to take any part whatever in its internal affairs is necessary, it is the duty of the civil authority, which always commands them in chief, to see that their instructions are such that they cannot err. It must be remembered that the officers of our army are gentlemen whose education, from the time they enter West Point, has

been exclusively and technically military. They are not trained in the atmosphere nor used to the habits which generate or follow civil ideas, and in the army are not permitted to hold civil or political office, while the instances of civilians of mature age entering the army are very rare. Indeed, our officers, as a class, are more purely military in their ideas and habits than are those of most of the armies of Europe, certainly more so than those of England, where men pass with ease and frequency to and fro between civil and military life and employments.

It should be the rule that the ring of sabres and the flash of bayonets should not be seen or heard in halls consecrated to civil legislation or to the voting by a free people. The army should only be called in to preserve the peace and suppress insurrection when the civil authorities fail. If, to preserve peace, it is necessary for troops to take possession of court-houses or legislative halls or voting-booths, they must understand that it is no part of their duty to discriminate between the rights of one and another class of claimants to seats in the legislature and upon the bench, or to the right of casting votes. Disputed claims to seats or votes are entirely civil matters, and must be passed upon by civil authorities only; and it is essential that claimants shall be admitted to be personally present in the assembly to which they claim membership. The soldier's first idea is to obey orders, and he looks to some one to give them. Relying on this, the first to gain possession of the seat of authority order out their opponents, and the soldier blindly executes the order. We do not mean to speak of any particular cases past, but of the natural and necessary results of military interference, if it is not most strictly preserved and guarded. The uneasiness of thinking men, not blinded by partisanship, arises from the fear that the military may be needlessly called for and used beyond their just functions.

But there is one conviction we hope will be always foremost in the minds and hearts of the American people. It is that we owe our first duty to the subject race which we have emancipated. The promise of this nation that they shall have freedom and civil and political equality is the most sacred promise we ever made. It is the most sublime and touching act in our history. Nothing can so much disgrace us as to violate it, or palter with it in a double sense. There is danger that this may be done. They are the

weaker race in every respect. The whites do not need protection against them, while the blacks do need the vigilance and power of men wiser and stronger than themselves, to protect their rights. The line of conduct is difficult to trace, in advance and in the abstract, and still more so, to be followed out in actual operation. The Republic must keep faith with the negro. For this, force — civil certainly, military possibly — must be used. The Republic must also respect the right of the States to manage their internal affairs, and to furnish their own police and militia for the preservation of order. It ought also to allow the white men of the South, who still furnish far the greater part of its education, its influence in the commonwealth, and its political capacity, to attempt to regain their control of affairs, irrespective of their having been once rebels; but they must understand that no part of the pecuniary consequences of their rebellion is to be shifted to the shoulders of the Republic. Violations of the Constitution or laws of Congress are individual acts, to be prevented or punished by civil methods, not to be mixed up with party politics, and to be regarded irrespective of race or former condition of master or slave, loyalty or disloyalty. All these considerations make the duty of those in office difficult of determination and execution; still the duty is one which can be performed, and there are some things which will make its performance easier. It is something towards peace to satisfy both classes at the South that the government of the United States is not a machine, run mostly in the interests of office-holders, and of such office-holders as we cannot always call on them to respect. In this view the Civil-Service Reform will be a great peacemaker. It will be still further in the service of peace if each class is made to understand that it is not regarded as purchasable material, — purchasable, we mean, not grossly, by money, but by political promises. It is obvious from this line of remark that we consider a great deal to depend upon the personal character and political purposes of the President, his counsellors, and the party leaders in Congress. If their will is in the right direction, there will be a way found, though it may be narrow and hard; if their will is not in consonance with these principles, they will doubtless find the broad road open, and tempting before them.

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